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The efforts to discourage foreign countries from confiscating
property and the question of reimbursement of U.S. citizens continue
to appear in various issues in the courts of the United States.
Zschernig v. Miller,
412 P.2d 781 (1966)
Pauline Schrader, a resident of Oregon, died intestate on Sep-
tember 30, 1962, leaving an estate in Oregon of both real and per-
sonal property. Her next of kin were non-resident aliens residing in
the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. This area is recognized by
Russia as a separate state, but not so recognized by the United
States, and is popularly known as "East Germany."
An Oregon statute provides that property will escheat to the
state of Oregon where claimed as inheritance by non-resident aliens,
unless the heirs can prove the following three factors:
1. Reciprocal right of citizens of the United States similarly
to take property from estates in the country of which the alien is an
inhabitant or citizen.
2. The right of citizens of the United States to receive within
the United States money originating from estates in such a foreign
country.
3. Proof that the alien heirs will receive the benefits, free of
confiscation in whole or in part, of money or property from estates
in Oregon left to them.
The court found that the heirs, residents of East Germany, had
failed to sustain the burden of proof required and the state of Oregon
was awarded the estate.
Another issue is the application of the Treaty of 1923 between
the United States and Germany (before the war and before the ac-
tual present, but unrecognized partition of Germany). The Supreme
Court of the United States has agreed (No. 730) to rule on the
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constitutionality of the Oregon statute. The decision of the Supreme
Court in this case will properly do much to clarify international law
in the area of conflicts both of ideology and law between the Free
and the Communist worlds.
Cases Nos. 63/2217 and 63/2467 In Re Rights of N. V. Cabolent
v. National Iranian Oil Company, Concerning Rights of Sapphire
Petroleum Ltd., a Canadian Company, District Court, The Hague,
May 17, 1965
The foreign case is one decided by the District Court of The
Hague, combining two pending cases identified as 63/2217 and
63/2467. In this combined case the court recognized that two theo-
ries of immunity existed, the absolute and the restricted; sovereigns
are amenable to the courts of other countries, if jurisdiction can be
obtained, for commercial liability under all circumstances if the
damage complained of occurred under an acta jure gestiones. The
determination of this case, therefore, rested on the facts as the courts
found them and the interpretation of those facts. The court stated
its position as follows:
This state of affairs with regard to the economic activity
of the State entails, however, that whenever a foreign defendant
pleads an alleged right to immunity under international law,
the Court will have to examine whether, in the matter of the
dispute before it, that defendant has acted jure imperii as an
organ of the foreign State that is to be identified with that
State.
In 1951 the sovereign country of Iraq created a joint stock
company to conduct the oil interests of that government. While
connected in one sense with the confiscation of Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company and the consequent series of cases and financial settle-
ments made by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companies, the issue here
was on a new and different contract between NIOC (the govern-
ment owned corporation entrusted with the oil business of Iraq)
and a foreign corporation. The latter had been induced to enter Iraq
by an agreement relating to the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum in a certain area defined in agreement. The agreement
was definite and was concluded in Iran on June 16, 1958. The
court held that this agreement was governed by Iranian law, that
NICO was an agent of the government of Iraq and must be con-
sidered to have all of the immunities which a sovereign govern-
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ment would have. The court concluded that NIOC was entitled to
the immunity of a sovereign acting jure imperii.
Neither the fact that the agreement, which has no point of
contact with the Netherlands legal sphere, makes provision for
arbitration in the cases therein specified, nor the fact that
NIOC had defended the present suit, can be seen as implying
a waiver of the right to claim immunity.
The Court accordingly decides as follows:
DELIVERING JUDGMENT:
in the joined cases:
declares itself incompetent to take cognizance of the claims
brought by the Plaintiff ...
The same question arises here which arose some years before
on similar, if not identical, conditions: whether or not a concession
agreement made by a country with a corporation, which is a national
of another country, is a commercial contract and should be con-
sidered as a purely commercial undertaking or whether it must be
considered as an act of state within that country because the agree-
ment relates to the natural resources of a particular country, or is
to be performed entirely within that country. The case, as reported,
does not indicate how jurisdiction was acquired. But since NIOC
defended the suit it must have appeared in the action and the court
would have (under United States law) acquired jurisdiction.
Chemical Nat. Resources v. Republic of Venezuela,
420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966)
The plaintiffs had purchased in 1952 mineral rights located in
the municipality of Pilar, Sucre, Venezuela. Subsequently the plain-
tiffs, through another company, contracted with a department of the
Venezuelan Government to erect facilities and convert certain ema-
nations of physical steam into electrical power which the Republic
of Venezuela (through one of its departments) agreed to purchase.
They then expended large sums of money to carry out their part
of the contract but thereafter the Government of Venezuela can-
celled the contract and confiscated the property, which resulted in
a loss of $116,000,000 to the plaintiffs. The case arose in Pennsyl-
vania by the attachment of a ship belonging to a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of the Venezuelan Government. In short, here was an effort
to subject certain property of a sovereign government for breach
of its contract which, again, may be characterized as a concession
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contract and, of course, the question was whether the court had
jurisdiction to hear and determine this action against the sovereign
State of Venezuela. The Tate letter was considered, as was also
the case of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (1961).
Also in this case, as in the Vacuba case, the U.S. State Department
gave a suggestion of immunity and the court declined jurisdiction.
In this case, however, one judge vigorously dissented and reviewed
the cases involving the liability of sovereigns and, combining his
arguments based on the Tate letter and the Sabbatino Amendment,
came to the conclusion that sovereign immunity in this instance
"is a relic of the law, overdue for interment in a legal museum."
In short, the Justice felt that the contract should be considered a
commercial transaction, and that a direct cause of action against
the confiscating government was proper. The Government of Vene-
zuela should be liable both as to jurisdiction and, too, as to judg-
ment as is any corporation which is alleged to have broken a con-
tract; and that Venezuelan commercial property should not be ac-
corded immunity.
Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba. Sociedad Anonima v. Snobl,
363 F.2d 733 (1966)
This case is the latest in a series of steps in an effort at en-
forcing a contract between the nationals of the United States and
a sovereign government, Cuba. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba is (or was) a Cuban corporation which had been organized
by the Republic of Cuba for the advancement of its foreign trade.
This was prior to any of the confiscations conducted by Cuba. This
Cuban state-owned corporation negotiated an agreement with an
American citizen to operate certain vessels owned by the Govern-
ment of Cuba. Pursuant to the agreement entered into by the parties,
a Cuban corporation was formed whose name appears in the cita-
tion to this case. This Cuban incorporated, United States citizen's
owned corporation was given an option to purchase the vessels but,
controversy having arisen concerning the operation of the contract
between the parties, a suit was instituted which resulted in a judg-
ment permitting the national of the United States Flota Maritima
to sell one of the vessels. The issue in the above cited case was
raised in regard to the sovereign immunity of the vessel from sale
since it was government owned. The question of general immunity
had previously been decided in the case of
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Flota Maritima Browning, Etc. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la
Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964), affirming, 218
F.Supp. 938 (1963)
The sovereign immunity question was raised not as to the claim
of the vessel's immunity from arrest, but immunity from sale on
the ground that, being property of a sovereign government, the vessel
was immune from seizure in satisfaction of judgment. The court
again decided against Cuba holding that when Banco Para El Comer-
cio Exterior de Cuba and the Government of Cuba entered the case
to contest the rights of the claimants they waived sovereign immunity
for all purposes, including immunity from execution. There was,
however, a dissent in the case which recommended holding the ves-
sel as it was, even risking further deterioration, and an immediate
trial of the issues to determine the rights of the parties prior to sale.
Columbia Nastri & Carta Carbone v. Columbia R. & C. Mfg. Co.,
367 F.2d 308 (1966)
This case raises the questions of jurisdiction of a United States
court to make an order which would have to be carried out in another
country. In 1924 a certain United States corporation created an
Italian corporation as its wholly-owned subsidiary to manufacture
the same products in Italy as the parent company manufactured
within the United States. Trademarks of that company to be used in
Italy by that subsidiary were the same as those the parent company
used in the United States and these were registered in Italy. At
the time this Italian corporation commenced business, the Fascist
Government of Italy was in control and because of its highly na-
tionalistic complexion and antagonism to foreign interests, the
trademarks were then registered in the name of the Italian corpora-
tion which was owned by American interests. In 1949 the stock
of the Italian corporation was sold to Italian interests and in the
memorandum of sale a royalty was provided. Under this agreement
of sale the American company continued to furnish know-how and,
among other things, granted the Italian corporation the exclusive
permission to use in Italy the trademarks which had previously been
registered in its name. Some 10 years later when relationships be-
tween the United States company and the Italian company had some-
what deteriorated, the Italian company stated that the Italian trade-
marks were its property and the royalty agreement was void. It was
the Italian company which brought the action in the Southern District
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of New York and this voluntary submission by the Italian company
to the District Court in New York appears to have been one, if not
the principal or controlling factor in the court's decision. In the
suit the United States company counterclaimed against the Italian
company and asked for an order directing that the company not be per-
mitted to use the trademarks or the name of the American company
in the Italian company's corporate name. It will be observed that
such an order practically, if not necessarily, compelled affirmative
action by the Italian corporation in Italy. The court observed: [T]he
manufacturing and selling activities were restricted to Italy ...
Nevertheless, the court held that this order was properly within the
discretion of the New York courts because of its jurisdiction over the
Italian company. The court held:
Under the circumstances of this case, it is not a requisite to
the issuance of the injunction that the applicant show that it
can be enforced. ...
Constructora Ordaz, N.V. v. Orinoco Mining Company,
262 F.Supp. 90 (1966)
The decision was on a motion requiring a determination of the
"forum conveniens." The plaintiff, a Netherlands Antilles corpor-
ation, by a contract, was obligated to deliver prestressed concrete
railroad cross-ties in Venezuela to the Orinoco Mining Company,
a Delaware corporation doing business in Venezuela. The defendant
urged that Delaware was not a "forum conveniens" because the con-
tract was to be performed in Venezuela, that Venezuelan substantive
law applied, and that the defendant's only contact with Delaware was
its incorporation there. Defendant, therefore, wished the court to
declare that the more convenient forum for the trial of the issues was
Venezuela whose courts also had jurisdiction of the parties and the
controversy.
The plaintiff insisted that Delaware was the more convenient
forum since all of the plaintiff's witnesses, including experts, resided
in the United States, and all testimony and documents would be in
the English language, which, if the trial were moved to Venezuela,
would have to be translated. The plaintiff also argued that it would
get a fairer trial in the United States. The plaintiff argued further
that a dismissal of this action with the privilege of commencing
anew in Venezuela would foreclose the plaintiff from bringing any
action since it had the financial resources to bring the action only
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in Delaware. The court, observing that the problems of the "forum
non conveniens" were not always easy, examined the contending
issues and retained the case on the stated grounds that:
1. Contingent fee contracts between attorneys and clients are
forbidden in Venezuela,
2. The courts of that country are slow in their procedures and
expensive,
3. The plaintiff lacked financial resources to prosecute the suit
effectively against a financially powerful adversary,
4. Pretrial procedures and subpoena procedure are superior in
the District Court in the United States to those in Venezuela,
5. Retention of the case would obviate the need of translation
into Spanish of every document and of the testimony.
These advantages overbalanced the interpretation which the
defendant's business in Venezuela might suffer by the necessity of
sending witnesses to Delaware.
Kirkland v. Sapphire International Touring, Ltd.,
262 F.Supp. 309 (1966)
An English automobile renting company was sued for injuries
sustained by plaintiff, an American tourist involved in an accident
alleged to be the fault of an English company in England. The facts
show that on March 17, 1964, the English company, Sapphire In-
ternational Touring, Ltd., through its N. Y. agent, contracted with
the plaintiff in New York to rent an automobile to the plaintiff for
use in England and to instruct the plaintiff in driving a motor vehicle
in England and also agreed to drive the vehicle by its own supplied
driver while the renter was being instructed. The action occurred
while the English driver supplied by the English company was driv-
ing the car and the injured party was a passenger in it. The plain-
tiff alleged that he had sustained personal injuries in the amount of
$350,000. The alleged agent was a New York corporation whose
place of business was in New York where it rented automobiles for
use in Europe. The Sapphire and American groups were independent
of each other. However, the President of the American company had
agreed orally to work with Sapphire and send business to them. The
procedure was that the American traveller would use his travel agent
to rent an automobile, specifying the make, in England. The travel
agent would inform F.I.T. Car Hire Company ("FIT"), which would
then ask Sapphire if a car would be available at the specified times.
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FIT stated, in writing, that it acted only as agents for the owners
providing the services listed and accepted no liability for loss, delay,
etc. On these facts the court found that Sapphire was not a proper
party to the action as it had never been served in the United States
and that service upon FIT did not subject it to courts of the United
States, nor did attempted service upon Sapphire in England grant
jurisdiction to United States courts under any long-term statute.
Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Res. v. Maison,
262 F.Supp. 871 (1966)
The issue here was between the restrictive laws of Oregon relat-
ing to hunting and fishing and a treaty concluded between the United
States and the Confederated Indian Tribes. Since the Constitution
of the United States provides in Article II, Section 2, that the Presi-
dent shall have the power to make treaties by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, whether or not a "treaty" with an Indian
tribe should have accorded to it the same status as a "treaty with a
foreign, independent and recognized government" has troubled the
courts; for example, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1
(1831). In the case here mentioned the courts interpreted the
"treaty" with the Indian tribe as the "supreme law of the land" and,
therefore, superior to the conservation laws of the State of Oregon.
The Confederated Indian Tribes contended successfully in their
demand for a declaratory judgment that the state regulations which
restricted hunting to certain lands would not apply to them because
of the existence of the treaty. The court defined the issue as "whether
a state is permitted to proscribe or limit the treaty rights of Indians
without suing that such restriction is indispensable" and held that
provisions of treaties with Indians must be construed as the Indian's
understood them at the time of the agreement. Judgment was awarded
to the Indian tribe.
Lee County School District Number 1 v. Gardner,
263 F.Supp. 26 (1967)
Courtright v. Pittman,
264 F.Supp. 114 (1967)
The above two cases may properly be contrasted on the ques-
tion of the liability of sovereigns within their own courts. This is
a significant question internationally in view of the general rule that
a diplomatic claim does not arise against a foreign government
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
706/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
unless a citizen of some country acting through his own government
claims damage by a foreign government and can show he has ex-
hausted all local remedies afforded by the offending government.
The first case above mentioned, the Lee County School District,
is not strictly against the government but against officials of the gov-
ernment who are alleged to have acted beyond the scope of their
authority and, therefore, their actions are null and void since they
are not properly the act of the United States Government. The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, as the court found, does not apply in
an action to prevent United States nationals from committing indi-
vidually unlawful acts and, of course, the fact that they did so under
color of authority would not prevent the damaged party from secur-
ing proper relief against those individuals.
Until the Court of Claims Act of 1855 this was the only method
of securing redress against the acts of officials of the Government
acting, or purporting to act, in that capacity. The Government of
the United States could not be sued. The Government in such an
instance was considered blameless since the laws were specific and
did not give authority to those who executed the law to do damaging
acts to citizens. This was not by the Government itself. This is the
basis of one of the older and oft reported cases of Brown v. United
States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
In the Lee County School District case the alleged wrongful act
was the withholding of federal funds for educational purposes and
the issue turned on whether or not by the action of the School Board
they were entitled to the funds or whether the action in withholding
funds was a proper one.
The second case mentioned is Courtright v. Pittman, which was
to enforce direct liability of the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. It was not until 1948, when this law went into
effect, that anyone had a direct cause of action for tort against the
Government of the United States itself. In the above case, Pittman
(the defendant jointly with the United States Government), was an
army serviceman who had been ordered from one post to another
and, in making that journey in his own car, was involved in an
accident. The court determined the issue of liability as it would
have determined a corporation case, stating that the test to be used
in determining whether the master (the United States Army) is
liable, under doctrine of respondiat superior for acts committed by
a servant, whom it had the right to control, not the actual detailed
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control, and after reviewing the circumstances the court held that the
United States was liable under the Colorado law applicable to torts.
Cotter Corporation v. Seaborg,
370 F.2d 686 (1966)
This case confirms that the United States cannot be sued with-
out its consent. Unless the claim against the United States is strictly
within the statutory provisions of those Congressional acts under
which the United States has agreed to be sued the United States has
sovereign immunity. However, wrongful acts of agents of the United
States have no immunity. -
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corporation,
372 F.2d 759 (1967)
In this case Hellenic Lines, Ltd., moved to compel arbitration
between itself and the Dreyfus Corporation. The latter corporation
resisted the attempt on the ground, as alleged, that its agreement to
arbitrate had been obtained by duress. Here is a situation in which
a foreign corporation, which, in previously reported cases, had in-
dicated its willingness to plead "sovereign immunity" sought to com-
pel a United States corporation to arbitrate in a commercial dispute.
Whether or not Hellenic Lines is or was an organization or arm of
a sovereign government is here immaterial because it has always
been the law in the United States that the government of a foreign
country could sue a United States corporation on a commercial
contract. The facts of this case are complicated and indicate a
series of economic acts and counter actions which the court refers
to as a "squabble." The Court of Appeals agreed with the District
Court's conclusion that:
'[Blecause the facts suggest that Dreyfus, a large company, was
substantially in an equal bargaining position with petitioner, it
ill behooves Dreyfus to argue that it was the victim of serious
economic duress in the classic legal sense.'
GMO. Niehaus & Co. v. United States,
373 F.2d 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
This was an action against the United States to recover com-
pensation for the alleged unlawful vesting by the Attorney General
on July 26, 1951, under the Trading With the Enemy Act (as
amended). The funds seized were admittedly property of a cor-
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poration which had been organized and existed within Costa Rica.
It was also admitted that there was a German interest in that cor-
poration, but the question before the court was the date at which
that German interest had arisen. The facts are extremely compli-
cated and involved not only the Trading With the Enemy Act but
the effect of a treaty with Germany. Although the opinion is long
and. explicit the following brief statement will indicate both the
decision of the court and its reason for that decision.
As shown elsewhere in this opinion, the individual plaintiffs'
rights in the seized property did not arise until December 1948
and January 1951, and therefore could not be vested by the
Attorney General under the Trading With the Enemy Act
because acquired after December 1946. By refusing to vest
property in the United States acquired by Germans after that
date, the Federal Government indicated that such property was
not war-connected. It follows that, so far as this property was
concerned, the plaintiffs' claim against the United States was
not war-connected, nor did it arise out of the occupation of
Germany. It was as if the property was brought into this
country from Germany in 1948 and 1951, for sale here or
other lawful purposes, and was then seized illegally by the
Federal Government. . ..
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
